Conventional class of weak keys on RC4 stream cipher is defined as a specific case that combinations of the first three bytes of secret key satisfy two relational equations. This paper expands and generalizes the classes of weak keys using generalized relational equations and special classes of the internal state (called predictive state). We derive the probability that generalized classes of weak keys leak the information of bytes of the secret key. Furthermore, we enumerate the generalized classes of weak keys and show that most of them leak more information of the secret key than Roos' one.
Introduction
RC4 [1] is the stream cipher designed by Rivest in 1987. It is adopted by part of encrypting protocols such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Transport Layer Security (TLS) [2] , Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) [3] , Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) [4] etc. The internal state of RC4 consists of the permutation array of the N(= 2 n ) elements with the size of n bits. RC4 generally has very large internal state of approximately 1,700 bits when n = 8 is used. In addition, the length of the secret key is variable, and 40-256 bits are usually used.
Several vulnerabilities of RC4 have been reported. These are divided into two classes. One is the vulnerability of the protocol using RC4 and the other is that of RC4 itself. The typical example of the former is the attack against WEP. The previous works concluded that WEP is not secure [5] - [11] , but these cannot affect the security of RC4 itself.
Many attacks on RC4 itself have been proposed, but so far no one has found an attack on RC4 which is even close to being practical. As the attack for RC4 itself, some internal state reconstruction attacks have been proposed [12] - [16] . These attacks exploit the special classes of RC4 partial states called predictive state. The predictive state creates unique patterns in the output stream and allows a viewer of the output stream to recover parts of the internal state with a non-negligible probability. In addition, several key recovery attacks on RC4 have been proposed. Most of them recover a secret key from an internal state when the Key SchedulManuscript received March 23, 2010. Manuscript revised July 15, 2010 . † The authors are with the Graduate School of Engineering, Kobe University, Kobe-shi, 657-8501 Japan.
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a) E-mail: teramura@stu.kobe-u.ac.jp DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E94.A. 10 ing Algorithm (KSA) was finished (called initial state) [17] - [20] . They used the relational equations between an initial state and a secret key for these attacks. These attacks need the information of the initial state, but it is generally not observable. This means that a key recovery attack from an initial state does not immediately pose an additional threat to the security of RC4. Unlike the initial state, it is relatively easy for an adversary to get the output stream. Thus, the key recovery attack from output stream poses more serious threat to the security of RC4 than that from an initial state. The key recovery attack from output stream has been proposed by Roos [21] . This attack exploits the class of weak keys. The class of weak keys proposed by Roos satisfies two relational equations between the bytes of the secret key and leaks the information of 8 bits of the secret key with probability 2 −2.9 . However, Roos has used only two specific equations and has not mentioned other equations between the bytes of the secret key.
Our motivation comes from the suspicion such that another relational equation must be included between the bytes of the secret key. In this paper, we present generalized classes of weak keys on RC4 using predictive state. First, we generalize relational equations between the bytes of the secret key, and analyze internal states obtained by the secret key that satisfies the generalized equations. Next, considering the relation between the analyzed internal state and the predictive state, we show that many secret keys satisfy the generalized relational equations. Hence, we obtain many secret keys whose the output stream leaks the information of them. Furthermore, we distinguish the classes with respect to the probability that a class of weak keys leaks the information of bytes of secret key, and enumerate the number of classes when the number of predictive state is small. It is revealed that most of them leak more information of bytes of the secret key than conventional one. For example, one of the generalized classes of weak keys that satisfies the five relational equations between the key bytes leaks the information of 40 bits of the secret key with probability 2 −7.1 . This paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, we review the algorithm of RC4 and class of weak keys proposed by Roos. We expand and generalize the class of weak keys and derive the probability the weak keys leaks these information in Sect. 3. We show the number of generalized class of weak keys and an example in Sect. 4 . Finally, we conclude this paper in Sect. 5.
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RC4
In this section, we briefly review the algorithm of the stream cipher RC4.
Description of RC4
The stream cipher RC4 consists of two algorithms: Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) and Pseudo-Random number Generation Algorithm (PRGA). The KSA initializes an internal state from a secret key K of l words of n bits and the PRGA generates a pseudo-random output stream Z from the initialized internal state as described in Fig. 1 . RC4's internal state consists of an N-byte permutation array S and two indices i and j. Let S i [x] be the value of the array S at the index x and S −1 i [y] be the index of the value y in the array S after the i-th round in the PRGA, respectively. Then j i is the value of j during the i-th round where the rounds are indexed with respect to i. We will use S * for the array S during the KSA (i.e. S 0 = S * N ). We define Z i as the output stream after the i-th round in the PRGA. In this paper, all operations are carried out under modulo N.
Roos' Weak Key
In 1995, Roos [21] defined a class of weak keys that satisfies the following equations,
where X ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. When a secret key is included in such a class, the output stream generated from the key satisfies Z 1 = X + 3 with probability 2 −2.9 . This implies that the information of one secret key byte is leaked.
In 2007, Paul and Maitra [17] , [18] theoretically analyzed the Roos' weak key. First, they showed that the equation Fig. 1 The RC4 algorithm.
holds if the following two conditions are satisfied: 
From this equation, S * [2] +3 hold with a high probability. Next, they presented the equation
holds if the following condition is satisfied:
If j is a random variable, then the probability that a particular single element of S * t will not be indexed by j at any time of the KSA is
From Eqs. (4) and (5), the following equation
holds for t = 1, 2 with the probability
Suppose that N = 256. From Eq. (7), the probability that [2] = X + 3 is output at the 1st round on the PRGA. This probability is approximately 0.368 · 0.362 ≈ 2 −2.9 .
Key Recovery Attack from Initial State
Although initial states using Eq. (6) are applied for the key recovery attack in the cases t = 1, 2 in [21], Paul and Maitra expanded the attack from the initial state in all cases t = 0, . . . , N − 1 in [17] , [18] , Their attack algorithm needs the information of the initial state as the input and tries to find the correct key. This attack is improved by Biham and Carmeli in [19] . However, their attacks have some faults. First, an adversary must know the information of initial state in advance. In general, it is difficult to observe the initial states. Second, Eq. (6) cannot be used to recover the secret key from the initial state satisfying the following condition † :
Predictive State
Fluhrer and McGrew have observed stronger correlations between output streams and the internal states, and introduced the notion as fortuitous state [13] . This is a special class of internal states defined by the values of i t , j t , and some state elements of array S at the t-th round, which can predict the output streams. Mantin and Shamir expanded and generalized the notion of fortuitous state as predictive state [14] . The predictive state is defined as follows.
Definision 1:
An a-state is a partially specified RC4 states, that includes i t , j t and a elements of array S at the t-th round
Definision 2:
Let X a be a set of internal states that include an a-state and let S a be an arbitrary internal state in X a . If every S a outputs a same sequence of b bytes then a-state is said to be b-predictive.
If four elements of the internal state satisfy Eq. (9), the internal state necessarily outputs 
The predictive state tends to satisfy Eq. (8) (8) . This means that the number of weak keys that satisfy all conditions is very small.
Generalization of Weak Key
The class of weak keys presented by Roos is merely a specific case which satisfies the two equations given by Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). We expand the class by generalizing the equations and the number of them using the predictive state proposed by Mantin and Shamir.
Idea
The two relational equations between the bytes of secret key were proposed by Roos. We generalize the relational equation as follows:
where w x,y ∈ {0, 1}, W y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} and y = 0, 1, 2, . . . . For example, in Roos' case,
and
The value of the element pointed by i or j is swapped from S * 0 (the case of i = j is excepted, but the probability of the case is very low [x] that satisfy the condition of a b-predictive a-state whose successful probability is denoted by P[E S 3 ]. If we succeed to operate these three steps, then the output stream must include the information of b relational equations between the bytes of secret key. Thus, the information of b bytes of secret key is leaked with probability
, where P[rand] is the probability that the information leaks by accident.
We define the generalized weak key as follows: 
is satisfied for all x ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x a } on the KSA, K w is in the generalized class of weak key.
Step 1
We discuss how to derive the relational equations that assign an arbitrary value X 1 to S *
. From the operation of the KSA described in Fig. 1 , we can represent the value of j * x 1 +1
as follows:
Remember that the value of S *
is satisfied if the following equation holds.
where S * −1
is the index of the value X in the array S * in the x 1 -th round in the KSA.
From Eq. (17), we derive the relational equation:
where w x,y and W y are
and W y = S * −1
respectively. Here X 1 is an arbitrary value and x 1 is an index satisfying 0 ≤ x 1 ≤ L − 1. If Eqs. (19) and (20) are satisfied, S *
] is always assigned a value X 1 . We assume that a following relational equations for x ∈ {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x a } hold in next steps.
where X ∈ {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X a }. Unlike Eq. (3) 
where A is sum of the indices {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x a }.
Step 3
Suppose that a b-predictive a-state at the t-th round (S (21) and (22), we consider that a relational equations for x ∈ {1, x 2 , . . . , x a } hold and X ∈ {S 0 [1] , S 0 [x 2 ], . . . , S 0 [x a ]}. Then, we can derive
where 
In the similar way for t = 0, we consider that a + 1 relational equations and we can derive
where
A b-predictive a-state at the t-th round is represented by
) and j t . Let j be a random variable. In the similar way for the KSA, the probability that
, and the probability that j t = j is 1/N. Then, we can derive
.
In the similar way for t = 1, 2, we consider a relational equations and we can get
From Eq. (29),
Relationship with Roos' Class
Assuming that the initial state satisfy following conditions;
then this state always outputs
This implies that the initial state that satisfies Eq. (34) is 1-predictive 2-state at the 0-th round. From Eq. (34), we derive the weak key class
This class leaks the information of one secret key byte with probability
, X}, this class is equivalent to Roos' class † (see Eqs. (13) and (15)). This means that the class of weak keys proposed by Roos is included in the generalized class of weak key. Roos presented some classes of weak keys in appendix of [21] but those are also included in the generalized class of weak keys.
Evaluation
The generalized class of weak keys exists on every bpredictive a-state. Thus, we can evaluate the number of generalized classes to enumerate b-predictive a-state. In this section, we present the number of generalized classes of weak keys to enumerate the b-predictive a-state experimentally. Furthermore, we show an example of generalized class that leaks the information of 40 bits of the secret key with a high probability. 10  1  283  9, 664  9, 156  8, 138  7, 630  6, 612  6, 104  5, 086  4, 578  3, 560  3, 052  2  2  1  3  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  69  7, 214  3, 849  3, 602  3, 284  3, 059  2, 473  2, 004  1, 672  1, 447  1, 118  3  3  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  145, 
Number of Generalized Classes
Paul and Preneel [15] have proposed the algorithm to find the class of a-predictive a-state for small a. We implemented the algorithm to find b-predictive a-state based on the algorithm proposed by Paul et al. This algorithm is described in appendix. We enumerated the number of bpredictive a-state for n = 8 experimentally, whose result is shown in Table 1 .
We can see that the number of classes of weak keys that satisfies a = 2 relational equations and leaks the information of b = 1 bytes at t = 0 round is 283. Roos' class is included in those. Hence, other numerous number represents the number of classes of weak keys that we discover. If b ≥ 2, the classes of weak keys leak more information of two bytes of the secret key. From Table 1 , thus, most of generalized classes leak more information of the secret key than Roos' class. We show an example of the classes we discover in the following section.
Experimental Result
In order to confirm the accuracy of the probability evaluation, we carried out the experiment. Before the experiment, we derived the class of weak key from the predictive state which we found in Sect. 4.1. In the experiment, we use 10 9 secret keys in the class of weak key for each a, b, and t † . We enumerated how many keys leak their information and calculated the probability. Table 2 shows the experimental values and the theoretical values for each t when a = 5 and b = 5. We can see that the theoretical values agree well with the experimental values.
In a similar way, we confirmed that the theoretical values agree well with the experimental values for all a and b. Due to limitation space, we have added only two results when a = 5 and b = 4 and when a = 4 and b = 4 to Table 2.
Example
We give an example of generalized classes of weak keys for n = 8. The algorithm described in appendix finds a 5-predictive 5-state at the 0-th round as follows; 
As the consequence, an adversary can recover 40 bits of the secret key with probability 2 −7.1 . This is the just one example of 71 classes (see Table 1 ).
On the other hand, this probability of Roos' case is described as follows, 
As the consequence, an adversary can recover 16 bits of the secret key with probability 2 −10.9 .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have generalized the class of weak keys on RC4 using b-predictive a-state. The generalized class of weak keys satisfies generalized relational equations between bytes of secret key, and leaks the information of secret key with a high probability. We have shown that the numerous number of generalized classes of weak keys exist among the secret keys. It is revealed that most of them leak more information of the secret key than conventional class of weak keys. 
